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WHAT CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS CAN TEACH US 
ABOUT THE STRUCTURE OF SUBCHAPTER C 
By Glenn E. Coven 
Glenn E. Coven is the Godwin Professor of Law at 
the College of William and Mary School of Law. 
Coven argues that the rules extending nonrecogni-
tion treabnent to the incorporation of property never 
have been properly integrated with the double taxa-
tion of corporations. As a result, the duplicate burden 
or benefit is applied retroactively. That defect, Coven 
believes, has been long overlooked, but now that it has 
been exploited by one popular version of the loss 
replicating corporate tax shelter, it must be addressed. 
The remedy applied by Congress to the tax shelter in 
section 358(h) is insufficient, does not operate correctly 
and undermines the integrity of the code, he says. 
This article proposes a more comprehensive solu-
tion that would improve the code by eliminating both 
the benefits and the burdens of the retroactive double 
tax through dual basis adjusbnents similar to those 
used in partnership taxation. The article was prepared 
before the adoption of section 362(e)(2). That provi-
sion, however, merely underscores the need for the 
solution suggested here, Coven concludes. 
The author would like to thank Jeffrey Kwall and 
John Lee for their thoughtful comments on a prior 
draft of this article. 
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I. Introduction 
In addressing the phenomenon of the corporate tax 
shelter, those who would curtail the perceived abuses 
have tended to proceed from the view that the shelters 
were derived from abusive, if not flatly erroneous, appli-
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cations of generally sound rules of law.l Accordingly, 
their proposals have adopted overarching but vague 
antiabuse principles2 or higher professional standards3 or 
enacted highly specific exceptions from the presumably 
abused rule for narrowly defined transgressions.4 While 
those approaches may be well tailored to some of the 
more egregious of the shelters, a significant sector of tax 
sheltering behavior, however, is nothing of the sort. For 
those shelters, those responses are entirely inadequate. 
Not all sheltering devices reflect an abusive interpre-
tation of generally sound tax rules. Rather, some are 
based on a logical, if extreme, application of well estab-
lished rules and principles. Nevertheless, the shelters 
achieve results that are wholly unacceptable. One expla-
nation for that seeming inconsistency is that the design-
ers of that set of corporate tax shelters have ferreted out, 
and pushed to their logical conclusion, several known, 
but long ignored, flaws and discontinuities in the design 
of subchapter C. 
After 90 years of evolution, there remain fissures of 
significant proportions in the fundamental structure of 
the Internal Revenue Code. Wholly aside from the need 
to stem the revenue loss attributable to corporate tax 
sheltering, those flaws in subchapter C are overdue for 
correction. In a very real sense, the shelters considered 
here can be viewed as having performed the public 
service of highlighting the need to return to the unfin-
ished business of drafting the structure of the corporate 
tax provisions. This article examines just one category of 
lSee, e.g., P. Canellos, "A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on 
Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business 
Transactions and in Tax Shelters," 54 SMU Law Rev. 47, 49 
(2001); G. Yin, "Thoughts on Tax Shelters," Tax Notes, Feb. 16, 
2004, p. 931. 
2See, e.g. , M. Jackel, "For Better or For Worse: Codification of 
Economic Substance," Tax Notes, May 24, 2004, p. 1069, discuss-
ing the various legislative proposals. For an excellent and 
extended discussion of the use of such broad standards, see 
"Symposium on Business Purpose, Economic Substance, and 
COI;F.0rate Tax Shelters," 54 SMU Law Rev. 3 (2001). 
U.s. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Law-
yers, and Financial Professionals, S. Hrg. 108-473 (2003), Doc 
2004-17374,2004 TNT 169-19; See K. Gary and S. Stratton,"Top 
Regulators Weigh In on Shelters," Tax Notes, Nov. 24, 2003, p . 
947. And see L. Sheppard, "Shelter Penalties: Or Else What?" Tax 
Notes, Jan. 12, 2004, p. 188, discussing revisions to Circular 230. 
4E.g., sections 358(h) and 1059(e)(1)(A)(iii) and prop. reg. 
section 1.752-7. 
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tax shelters and the fundamental flaw on which it relied.s 
As might be expected of flaws in the code that have 
remained uncorrected for nearly a century, the proper 
solutions to the perceived flaws in subchapter C are not 
always evident or likely to attract unanimous approval. 
Nevertheless, revision of the code is essential both to 
prevent the sheltering activities and to further the overall 
fairness of the corporate tax rules. 
II. Exploiting the Conceptual Flaw in Section 351 
One of the more commonly used corporate tax shelters 
was also, conceptually at least, one of the more simple. By 
exploiting one of the most fundamental flaws in the 
design of subchapter C, the promoters of the seemingly 
infinite varieties of this shelter offered the ability to 
reproduce and perhaps accelerate tax losses. As a result, 
taxpayers sought to obtain two, if not more, losses for tax 
purposes attributable to a single economic loss. While the 
mere statement of that desired consequence suggests that 
the scheme was improper and the sought after result not 
allowable, the reality is far more complex. 
A. The Scheme 
To see how the scheme was thought to work in its 
elementary form before the legislation adopted in Octo-
ber 2004, consider a hypothetical6 corporate taxpayer we 
shall call Dolly Inc. Dolly has an asset that has a very high 
tax basis but a very low value. We will examine the exact 
nature of the asset later; for present purposes, its nature 
does not matter and it is easiest to think of the asset as a 
rather disappointing investment in bare land. The asset 
has a tax basis of $561 million but a value of only $1 
million, leaving Dolly with a built-in loss for tax pur-
poses of $560 million. The plan is for Dolly to transfer 
that asset to a newly formed subsidiary corporation, 
Subdolly, in exchange for the voting stock of the subsid-
iary, in a transaction that will qualify for nonrecognition 
treatment under section 351 of the code. In that event, 
under section 358(a) Dolly will obtain a tax basis in the 
stock received of the same $561 million although, of 
course, the value of the stock would be only $1 million. 
Moreover, under section 362(a), Subdolly will acquire a 
carryover basis in the transferred asset of the same $561 
million. 
As can be seen, after the incorporation transfer the 
Dolly Group will have two losses for income tax pur-
poses although before the incorporation there was only 
one. Eventually Subdolly will sell the asset and claim the 
resulting tax loss of $560 million, and at some point Dolly 
will dispose of the Sub dolly stock and claim a similar 
loss. After that chain of events, the Dolly Group will have 
claimed losses for tax purposes totaling about $1.12 
billion although it will have sustained an economic loss 
of only half that amount. 
SA second shelter category worth examining later is the 
basis-shifting shelter. Those transactions exploited both glaring 
inadequacies in the regulatory scheme and mistakes in the 
statutory scheme. 
~he hypothetical is loosely based on the reported facts of 
Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, No. WDQ-02-2070, Doc 
2004-15893,2004 TNT 150-10 (N.D. Md. Aug. 3, 2004). 
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Even more troubling, Subdolly might clone the entire 
transaction rather than just the loss. If Subdolly retrans-
fers the asset to Secondtierdolly in another section 351 
exchange, it would appear to create a third income tax 
loss for the Dolly Group - still, of course, attributable to 
the single economic loss incurred by Dolly immediately 
before setting this series of events in motion. To under-
stand exactly how those rather bizarre results happen 
under the income tax rules requires rehearsing some 
well-known corporate tax concepts. 
B. The Flaw in Section 351 
The most fundamental feature of the system used in 
the United States for taxing corporations is the applica-
tion of two, largely distinct levels of taxation on corporate 
profits. As is well understood, the operating income of 
the corporation is first taxed when it is earned at the 
corporate level and at a rate that is comparable to the 
rates of tax imposed on individuals. However, when 
those earnings are realized by the owners of the business, 
either through distributions from the corporation to the 
shareholder or through sales of stock by the shareholder, 
the resulting income or gain is taxed a second time. The 
rate of this second, shareholder-level tax varies with the 
manner in which the earnings are realized at the share-
holder level and has varied over time.? Still, the 
shareholder-level tax is a significant tax burden that 
drives a great deal of corporate tax planning. Corre-
spondingly, much of subchapter C exists solely to deter 
avoidance of the second tax. 
Under our tax laws, the system of double taxation is 
unique to corporations and has always been somewhat 
controversial. Most other countries have developed inte-
grated systems that avoid or mitigate the double tax,8 
and even the United States has recently enacted a mate-
rial reduction in the rate of the shareholder-level tax. 
Nevertheless, the double tax system persists, partly be-
cause of revenue needs9 and partly because some regard 
the additional tax burden as appropriate in principle, 
either as a response to the enhanced economic benefits of 
incorporation or because of a perceived reality to the 
identity of corporations and their managers apart from 
their (separately taxed) owners.lO In any event, under the 
7Historically, the shareholder-level tax was imposed at ordi-
nary income tax rates if the earnings were distributed as 
dividends but at capital gains rates if they were distributed as 
redemptions. Traditionally, dividends were thus taxed at about 
twice the rate of redemptions. Today, of course, all distributions 
are taxed at the same rate although a recovery of basis is 
allowed in the case of redemptions but denied in the case of a 
dividend. Section l(h)(ll). 
BSee M. Graetz and A. Warren, "Integration of Corporate and 
Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction to the Issues," in 
Integration of the U.S. Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: The 
Treasury Department and American Law Institute Reports (Tax 
Analysts, Arlington, Va., 1998). 
9See S. Bank, "Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the 
Rise of Double Taxation," 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 167 (2002). 
lOSee R. Goode, The Corporate Income Tax (Wiley, 1951), and R. 
Rudnick, "Who Should Pay the Corporate Tax in a Flat Tax 
World?" 39 Case West. Res. L. Rev. 965 (1988-89). 
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u.s. system, the two-tiered pattern of taxation is applied 
only to the earnings of incorporated entities. 
A second feature of the system embodied in subchap-
ter C for taxing corporations - not nearly as fundamen-
tal as the double tax but a part of the structural founda-
tion of the subchapter nonetheless - is that the mere 
incorporation of assets is not the appropriate occasion for 
taxing the appreciation, or recognizing the loss, inherent 
in those assets. In a broad range of circumstances, incor-
porating transactions are extended the same nonrecogni-
tion treatment that is used elsewhere in the code to 
prevent the recognition of income. Accordingly, under 
section 351, the gain contained in the incorporated prop-
erties is not subject to tax at the time of the transfer 
despite that the exchange of properties for stock in the 
transferee corporation would otherwise constitute a tax-
able event. Nonrecognition, however, is only a timing 
concept. The gain that escapes tax today is to be taxed in 
the future at a more appropriate occasion. The preserva-
tion of that gain is accomplished by the making of a 
proper adjustment to the basis of whichever property 
will preserve the untaxed gain to the appropriate tax-
payer. 
Nonrecognition operates in several different ways 
under the code. For example, on a gift of appreciated 
property, the donor is not subject to tax but receives no 
property in exchange. In that context, the basis of the 
transferred property carries over and becomes the basis 
of the transferred property in the hands of the donee. ll 
Thus, the gain is preserved to the donee who, for those 
purposes, is treated as a continuation of the transferor. 
However, in an exchange by two unrelated taxpayers of 
"like kind" properties, the transferor is also excused from 
a current tax under the nonrecognition provisions of 
section 1031. However, in that transaction the transferor 
obtains a replacement property of equivalent value in the 
exchange. In that context, the basis of the property 
transferred away becomes, or in the tax lexicon is substi-
tuted for, the basis of the replacement property received 
in the exchange. 12 That substitution of basis ensures that 
the amount of gain that was not taxed on the exchange 
will be taxed in the future and will be taxed to the 
transferor. In contrast to the treatment of gifts, under 
section 1031, the basis of the transferred property does 
not carryover into the hands of the transferee for two 
reasons. The transferee is a wholly separate taxpayer 
whose gain or loss is determined by factors that pertain 
to the transferee and not by factors that pertain to the 
transferor. Second, the substitution of the old basis into 
the replacement property adequately preserves the gain 
that was not taxed at the time of the exchange and it 
would not be appropriate to adjust the basis of the 
property in the hands of the transferee to create a second 
deferred gain. 
As can be seen, nonrecognition works in different 
ways depending on the nature of the transaction. The old 
basis may stay with the property to preserve the amount 
of gain in the hands of a different taxpayer or it may shift 
llSection 1015. 
12Section 1031(d). 
TAX NOTES, November 8, 2004 
COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
to a new property to preserve the gain to the same 
taxpayer. In either context, in a single tax system, non-
recognition works properly and efficiently to defer tax on 
the correct amount of gain. 
An incorporation transaction can be viewed as com-
bining elements of both gifts and section 1031 exchanges. 
The reason that the exchange is granted nonrecognition is 
that the transferor is viewed as continuing the ownership 
of the transferred properties through a change in the 
form of ownership. Accordingly, it is appropriate to treat 
the transferee corporation as a continuation of the trans-
feror, much as the donee is treated. However, much like 
in a section 1031 exchange, the transferor receives re-
placement property in the form of stock in the corpora-
tion. It would be both feasible and appropriate to adjust 
the basis of the stock received to ensure the future 
taxation of the transferor. 
While either the gift or the section 1031 approach 
might appear justified, section 351 and the basis rules 
that accompany it treat each of those elements of incor-
porations as creating two separate nonrecognition trans-
actions. That is, while the transferor's basis in the trans-
ferred property carries over to the transferee corporation, 
it is also substituted as the basis of the stock received in 
the exchange. The effect of all of this, under the double 
tax system that applies to corporations, is to create two 
separate gains, each of which will become subject to tax, 
while before the transaction only a single gain existed. 
To illustrate, assume that an unincorporated business 
holds properties that have a total value of $561 million 
and a tax basis of $1 million. If sold, the owner of the 
business would have a taxable gain of $560 million. If, 
however, the business were incorporated under the rules 
of section 351, the owner would not be subject to any 
current gain. Instead, the $1 million basis of the assets 
would carryover with the assets to the corporation and 
the corporation would face a deferred gain of the same 
$560 million. Also, the former owner of the assets now 
owns stock in the corporation, and the tax basis of that 
stock is also derived from the basis of the now-
incorporated assets. Thus, the new shareholder's tax 
basis for the stock in the corporation will also be $1 
million. As can be seen, where before the incorporation 
there was a single gain of $560 million, after the incorpo-
ration there are two gains of $560 million inherent in that 
business activity. Thus, eventually the corporation will 
dispose of the transferred asset, generating a gain of $560 
million and the shareholder will dispose of the stock in 
the corporation, generating a second and similar13 gain. 
What is remarkable about the illustrated consequence 
of section 351 is not that the income generated by the 
incorporated assets will become subject to two levels of 
taxation, for that is the natural and correct consequence 
of the double tax system. The remarkable feature of this 
routine application of section 351 is that the consequence 
of incorporation is applied retroactively. That retroactive 
lYrhe gain on the sale of the stock should be reduced by the 
amount of taxes paid by the corporation on the corporate-level 
gain since that payment would reduce the net worth of the 
corporation. 
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application of the double tax is plainly wrong. The $560 
million gain now inherent in both the corporate assets 
and the owner's stock arose before incorporation and 
before the taxpayer was subject to the double tax system. 
While the application of the double tax system to income 
arising from incorporated assets is an accepted, if not 
entirely defensible, aspect of our tax system, there is no 
justification for the retroactive application of the double 
tax to income economically accruing before incorpora-
tion. Whatever benefits of incorporation can be said to 
justify the extra burden of the double tax14 plainly do not 
apply to income earned before incorporation. 
Nor can it be said that retroactive double taxation is an 
appropriate price for nonrecognition under section 35l. 
Nonrecognition is extended under the code in a wide 
range of circumstances, as illustrated above, and in no 
other context is a comparable penalty imposed.15 Because 
that manifestly improper retroactive application of the 
double tax flows from the mandatory application of the 
basis rules that accompany section 351, the conclusion is 
inescapable that those rules, embodied in sections 358 
and 362, are flawed. 
The obvious imperfection in interaction between the 
double tax system and nonrecognition under section 351 
was not a matter of particular concern to either taxpayers 
or the IRS until recently. One reason for that perhaps 
surprising passivity is that during the years preceding 
1986 the double tax system was not necessarily a burden 
on taxpayers. Before that year a combination of tax 
systems features tended to produce an overall tax burden 
on corporations, particularly small corporations, that in 
many instances was actually lower than the tax burden 
imposed on unincorporated enterprises despite the for-
mal imposition of two levels of tax. 16 In that environ-
ment, the retroactive application of the double tax was 
not necessarily burdensome and may have been of ben-
efit to taxpayers. Under current law, however, the double 
tax system is almost always a burden on the taxpayer. 
Except for the smallest of corporations,17 the corporate 
level tax is comparable to the total tax imposed on 
unincorporated business. As a result, the shareholder-
level tax, regardless of how reduced by current law, 
produces a burden not born by noncorporate taxpayers. 
Accordingly, the retroactive application of the double tax 
now will commonly produce a significant unwarranted 
burden. 
14See J. Kwall, "The Uncertain Case Against the Double 
Taxation of Corporate Income," 68 N.C. L. Rev. 613 (1990), and 
see supra note 7. 
15In addition to gifts and section 1031 exchanges, nonrecog-
nition applies to such diverse transactions as lease terminations 
(section 109), cancellation of indebtedness (section 108), con-
demnations (section 1033), and reorganization exchanges (sec-
tions 354 and 361). 
16See A. Warren, "The Relation and Integration of Individual 
and Corporate Income Taxes," 94 Harv. L. Rev. 719 (1981), and J. 
Lee, "A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax 
Universe," 78 Texas L. Rev. 885 (2000). 
17The progressive rate structure of section 11 continues to 
provide opportunities to shelter small amounts of income from 
the higher tax rates applicable to individuals. 
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The retroactive application of the double tax resulting 
from a section 351 exchange appears to first have become 
a concern to the IRS when taxpayers discovered how to 
systematically turn the flaw in the operation of the 
nonrecognition rules to their advantage. The opposite of 
a $560 million gain, of course, is a $560 million loss, and 
while gains are a burden to taxpayers from the tax 
perspective, losses are a benefit. Taxpayers learned that 
they could tum that flaw in subchapter C to their 
advantage by transferring high-basis/low-value prop-
erty, that is, property containing a built-in loss, to a 
corporation in a section 351 transaction. And that, of 
course, is exactly what our hypothetical Dolly Inc. did. 
Dolly's transaction obviously cannot be allowed. 
Dolly has discovered a technique for obtaining losses for 
income tax purposes that are many times the economic 
loss incurred. The replicated losses do not reflect an 
economic loss and cannot be allowed without undermin-
ing the integrity of the computation of taxable income. 
Nevertheless, the cloning of losses engaged in by Dolly, 
while perhaps surprising in result, is nothing more than 
a routine application of the flawed basis rules that have 
been a part of subchapter C throughout its history. While 
most taxpayers engaging in a section 351 exchange are 
deferring a gain and thus are prejudiced by the retroac-
tive double tax, Dolly is deferring a loss and is therefore 
benefited by the retroactive duplicated loss. Neverthe-
less, both Dolly's dual loss and the dual gain imposed on 
others flow from the same rules and reflect the same 
technical flaw. 
Because of the potential seriousness of the replication 
of losses to the integrity of the corporate income tax, the 
tax shelter required a response from the Treasury Depart-
ment. In seeking to attack this transaction, however, the 
focus of Treasury was the duplicated loss and thus the 
remedy sought was the elimination of the duplication.18 
That response is inadequate. The fundamental impropri-
ety in Dolly Inc.'s transaction does not tum on the 
existence of a loss but turns on the existence of a 
duplication - whether of a loss or a gain. It is just as 
inappropriate to tax a gain that does not reflect an 
economic gain as it is to allow a loss for tax purposes that 
does not reflect an economic loss. The statutory flaw that 
is in need of correction is in the routine operation of the 
basis rules that accompany section 351 and in the way in 
which those rules interact with the double tax system. 
It would be wrong to eliminate the admittedly erro-
neous duplicated loss, which benefits taxpayers, without 
simultaneously eliminating the erroneous duplicated 
gain, which prejudices taxpayers. Indeed, over the nearly 
100 years in which the rules have operated, it is more 
than likely that the amount of duplicated gains created 
by the basis rules have exceeded the amount of dupli-
cated losses. From that perspective it would seem more 
urgent to eliminate the double taxation of gains than to 
address the double creation of losses. Indeed, it would 
seem inappropriate for Treasury to correct the flaw in the 
basis rules only when the duplication is prejudicial to the 
18Notice 2002-18, 2002-1 C.B. 644, Doc 2002-5894, 2002 TNT 
46-14. See also section 358(h), discussed below. 
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government. Such "heads we win, tails you lose" rules 
are facially unfair and tend to undermine taxpayer con-
fidence in the tax system. A proper solution to the abuses 
created by the loss-cloning tax shelter would be to 
address the underlying flaw in the section 351 basis rules 
by eliminating the retroactive application of the double 
tax system regardless of whether those rules duplicated 
gains or losses. 
It might be argued that eliminating the duplicated loss 
without eliminating the duplicated gain would be appro-
priate by analogy to other provisions of the code that 
appear to do precisely that. Indeed, some provisions in 
the code do limit the claiming of losses in circumstances 
in which gains would be taxed, generally because of 
doubt concerning the substance of the claimed loss. Loss 
disallowance occurs, for example, when property is sold 
to a related taxpayer19 or when property substantially 
identical to the property sold is promptly repurchased.20 
Those transactions amount to a technical realization of 
gain or loss21 and ought to be treated as taxable events 
unless some strong principle of income tax policy over-
rides that result. On the gain side, no principle of income 
tax policy is offended by imposing a tax on gain when a 
taxpayer chooses to accelerate when an unrealized gain 
becomes subject to tax by engaging in a sale. Therefore, 
taxation of the gain remains appropriate. However, on 
the loss side, it would be appropriate for Congress to 
conclude, as it did, that sound income tax policy would 
be offended by allowing taxpayers to obtain the benefit of 
a technical loss that was not, in economic substance, 
sustained either because the property was retained 
within the taxpayer's economic group or was promptly 
replaced by identical property. Thus, disallowance or 
deferral of the loss becomes appropriate. 
Those rules, however, do not justify eliminating the 
replicated loss while perpetuating the replicated gain. 
The fundamental flaw in the section 351 basis rules is not 
derived from a perceived artificiality in the realization of 
the loss claimed but rather lies in the inappropriateness 
of applying those basis rules in a manner that creates a 
retroactive double tax. That is, the duplicate gain is as 
improper as the duplicated loss. The retroactive effect of 
the basis rules offends principles of sound income tax 
policy regardless of whether the income tax consequence 
is a gain or a loss. 
III. Creating Built-In Losses 
The basis rules that accompany section 351 would 
never have formed the basis for a corporate tax shelter if 
taxpayers had not discovered how to manufacture prop-
erty that has a high tax basis but a low value and thus 
contains a built-in income tax loss. The clearest example 
of such an asset would be an item of property that has a 
high undepreciated original cost basis but a low present 
value, such as land. However, it is difficult to acquire 
such an item of property without also incurring an 
19Section 267(a)(1). 
20Section 1091. 
21See Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991). 
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economic loss.22 Another approach to creating high-
basis/low-value property is to acquire property subject 
to an indebtedness that reduces the net value of the 
property. Thus, for example, in our original example 
involving Dolly Inc.'s formation of a subSidiary, Dolly 
might have transferred to the subsidiary cash in the 
amount of $561 million while causing the subsidiary to 
assume an obligation of Dolly's to pay contingent future 
healthcare claims of Dolly's employees (or to restore land 
that had been strip mined under environment remedia-
tion legislation, and so forth) . 
The transfer of that property subject to routine acqui-
sition indebtedness does not produce the tax conse-
quence that Dolly desires. The assumption of a liability of 
the transferor by the corporation constitutes an economic 
benefit to the transferor in that amount. Accordingly, 
under the normal basis rules of section 351, the assump-
tion is treated as a distribution of money and the basis for 
the stock received is reduced by the amount of that 
constructive distribution, thus eliminating any possibility 
of loss to the transferor / shareholder. 23 Similarly, the 
actual payment of the acquisition indebtedness by the 
corporation would not be deductible. 
Both of these infirmities, however, will be overcome if 
the liability assumed is one for which the payment will 
be deductible. In that event, the liability embodies a 
future income tax loss that may be used by taxpayers like 
Dolly in a loss replication scheme. To illustrate, assume 
that a corporate taxpayer owns land on which mining has 
occurred as a result of which the taxpayer is under a fixed 
legal obligation to partially restore the land to its premi-
ning state. That obligation creates a financial liability for 
the corporation but one that is not currently deductible, 
even by an accrual method taxpayer.24 The gross value of 
the land is $10 million and the predicted future cost of the 
environmental remediation is $9 million. If the taxpayer 
does not transfer the land, the taxpayer will ultimately 
pay the costs of restoring the land, which will leave it 
with property worth $1 million and a tax loss of $9 
million. 
If the taxpayer transfers the land, subject to the 
liability, to a newly formed subsidiary in a section 351 
exchange, the basis of the stock received will be the $10 
million substituted from the transferred land without 
reduction attributable to the liability. Because the liability 
is one for which the payment has not yet produced a tax 
benefit, under section 358(d)(2), its assumption by the 
corporation is not treated as a distribution of cash and 
does not affect the basis of the stock received. That is the 
correct resulP5 On a sale of the stock of the subsidiary, 
22Por other approaches, see Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, 
Doc 2000-21236, 2000 TNT 157-7. 
23Section 358(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (d)(l). 
24Even if a deduction for the liability were otherwise accru-
able, the deduction would be barred by the economic perfor-
mance rules of section 461(h) . 
2s-rhe matter is a bit more complex. Any assumption of a 
liability produces an economic benefit and thus should be 
treated by sections 357 and 358 as a distribution of cash which, 
if not taxed, should result in a downward basis adjustment. 
However, if the liability is deductible, the assumption also 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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the taxpayer would receive net proceeds of $1 million 
and would obtain a tax loss of $9 million - exactly the 
same result as if the land had not been transferred to the 
corporation. However, on the ultimate payment of the 
remediation expenses, the subsidiary corporation will 
also obtain a tax loss in the amount of $9 million - a 
second, duplicated tax loss.26 
The result here is not different from the result reached 
by Dolly Inc. As has been seen, the normal operation of 
the basis rules accompanying section 351 quite inappro-
priately duplicate both built-in gains and built-in losses. 
The fact that the loss is an unmatured business liability 
rather than an unrealized loss in property is completely 
immaterial. Accordingly, the appropriate legislative re-
sponse would be the same as the appropriate response to 
Dolly's case: the elimination of the duplication. That, 
however, is not what occurred. 
To understand the inadequacy of what did occur, it is 
necessary to review the history of section 358(d). Before 
1978 the basis of stock received in a section 351 exchange 
was reduced by the amount of all liabilities assumed by 
the corporation, whether deductible or not. When the 
liability was deductible, but had not yet been deducted, 
that produced the wrong result to the transferor. It 
overstated the taxable income of the transferor by deny-
ing any tax benefit to the transferor attributable to the 
loss that the liability reflected.27 That error was corrected 
by adding paragraph (2) to section 358(d) to prevent 
reducing the basis of the stock received when the liabili-
ties assumed were deductible, thus preserving the basis 
to produce a tax benefit in the future . 
In 1978 it was thought that the liabilities most affected 
by the amendment were the accounts payable of a 
cash-method taxpayer. In time, however, the IRS realized 
that the same principle applied to all deductible but 
undeducted liabilities regardless of the reason for the 
lack of deduction. Thus, in 1995 the Service issued Rev. 
Rul. 95-7428 holding that section 358(d)(2) applied to the 
liability to perform environmental remediation years, if 
not decades, in the future. While that ruling was certainly 
correct for the same reason that the original 1978 amend-
ment was correct, it created greatly expanded opportu-
nities for tax shelter abuse. The substantial, long-term 
liabilities potentially covered by that ruling were far 
should result in a tax benefit; if not an immediate deduction, 
then an upwards basis adjustment. The net effect of those 
theoretical downward and upward adjustments is to leave the 
stock basis unaffected by the assumption of the deductible 
liability, the result reached by section 358(d)(2). 
26See Hempt Bros. Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 
1974). When liabilities are assumed in an isolated transaction, 
not a part of the transfer of all of the assets of a business, the 
Service may be able to challenge this deduction by the transferee 
under the authority of such cases as Holdcroft Transp. Co. v. 
Commissioner, 153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1946), but only if the 
transferor is allowed to claim the deduction. 
27Coven, "Liabilities in Excess of Basis: Focht, Section 
357(c)(3) and the Assignment of Income," 58 Ore. L. Rev. 61 
(1979). 
281995-2 C.B. 36, Doc 95-9854, 95 TNT 212-35. See also FSA 
199929015, Doc 1999-24825, 1999 TNT 142-53. 
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easier to use in a loss replication scheme than were the 
accounts payable of a roofing contractor. 
Congress responded to the abuse of Rev. Rul. 95-74 by 
eliminating the tax benefit to the transferor from the 
liabilities assumed that resulted from the preserved basis 
in the stock received in the section 351 exchange. Under 
newly added subsection 358(h), if the stock received in a 
section 351 exchange contains a built-in loss, that is, has 
a tax basis in excess of its fair market value, the basis 
must be reduced by the amount of any deductible or Rev. 
Rul. 95-74 type liability assumed by the transferee corpo-
ration in the exchange (but not below its fair market 
value) . In other words, in the convoluted style to which 
the drafters of tax legislation have become addicted, 
Congress in subsection 358(h) partially repealed the basis 
preservation rule that it had created in 1978. Since the 
1978 amendment and its extension in Rev. Rul. 95-74 
were correct, section 358(h) obviously produces an erro-
neous result. 
In fact, section 358(h) has produced a result that is less 
rational than the pre-1978 rule. One of the most common 
mistakes in drafting corrective tax legislation is to focus 
narrowly on the specific result to be altered without 
understanding the underlying problem that is producing 
the result. In that regard, section 358(h) is a major 
offender. Because the section was focused on preventing 
an immediate, duplicate loss, it produces results that are 
arbitrary, unfair, and irrational. Consider a taxpayer like 
Dolly who transferred property having a basis and value 
of $10 million subject to a deductible liability of $9 
million. After the application of section 358(h), the basis 
of the stock in the hands of the transferor will be just $1 
million. As required by the subsection, the basis of the 
stock has been reduced by the $9 million amount of the 
assumed deductible liability to, but not below, its market 
value. As a result, Dolly has been denied a tax benefit 
attributable to the entire $9 million liability assumed by 
the subsidiary. 
However, that result changes radically if Dolly also 
contributes to the subsidiary'S valuable but low-basis 
property. Thus, if Dolly also contributes a tract of unpro-
ductive land being held for future use worth $5 million 
but having a tax basis of $500,000, the basis of the stock 
received, aside from the application of subsection (h), 
would be $10 million plus $500,000 reduced by zero 
attributable to the deductible liability or $10.5 million. 
However, the net value of the stock would be $6 million. 
Accordingly, because under section 358(h) the basis of the 
stock can only be reduced by the difference between its 
basis and value, the stock basis is reduced by $4.5 million 
to $6 million. As a result, Dolly would be denied a tax 
benefit of only one-half of the amount of the liability 
assumed. It would still be entitled to a tax benefit of $4.5 
million! 
That is the wrong result. If it were improper for the 
transferor to retain a basis in the stock received attribut-
able to a deductible liability that has been assumed, then 
the basis of the stock should be reduced by the full 
amount of the liability to $1.5 million. That approach, 
while perhaps unfair (or so it is argued here), would at 
least be consistent across transferors of varying mixes of 
property. However, there is no rational reason why a 
taxpayer should be able to manipulate the extent of 
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entitlement to a tax benefit attributable to a liability 
assumed in a section 351 exchange through unrelated 
transfers of assets. That is, there is nothing in our 
example about the transfer of unproductive land that 
should affect Dolly's entitlement to a tax benefit attrib-
utable to th~ liability. Dolly's basis should either be $10.5 
million or $1.5 million; it should not be something in 
between. Focusing on the wrong problem, section 358(h) 
produced the wrong answer. 
In enacting subsection 358(h) Congress may have 
recognized that it was adopting a technically incorrect 
rule because it sought to limit the damage it was doing to 
the structure of the code by exempting from the repeal 
assumptions of liabilities incident to the transfer in a 
section 351 exchange of all of the assets of a business. In 
retaining the 1978 basis preservation rule for transactions 
occurring in the normal course of business but repealing 
that rule for isolated transactions, Congress evidently 
assumed that transactions undertaken primarily for tax 
reduction purposes were isolated and generally could 
not involve the transfer of entire businesses. Whether 
that is so and whether the IRS can administer the line 
drawn by the exception to subsection 358(h) remains to 
be seen. What is evident is that section 358(h) has added 
a convoluted, difficult-to-enforce, technically incorrect, 
and fundamentally unfair rule to the basis computations 
following a section 351 exchange in an effort to mitigate 
some of the adverse consequences of the retroactive 
application of the double tax. 
Moreover, section 358(h) does not even address, much 
less resolve, the problem of duplicated losses not attrib-
utable to deductible liabilities. As seen above, the as-
sumption of deductible liabilities is merely one of the 
ways in which the basis rules accompanying section 351 
create a duplicate loss. Taxpayers incorporating property 
containing other sorts of built-in loss are wholly unaf-
fected by the legislative solution. Plainly, addressing the 
fundamental flaw in the section 351 basis rules would 
have been a superior approach from every perspective. 
IV. Remedying the Defect in the Basis Rules 
It is clear enough that the nonrecognition rules accom-
panying section 351 have never been properly integrated 
with the double taxation of corporations that the United 
States continues to use. As long as that flaw in the basis 
rules primarily resulted in a deferred capital gains tax to 
the shareholder, the flaw did not appear sufficiently 
serious enough to justify the difficult task of synthesizing 
those two concepts. However, now that taxpayers have 
discovered techniques for exploiting this flaw, it has 
become necessary to address the issue. Merely disallow-
ing the duplicated loss, however, along the lines of 
section 358(h) is not a sufficient response. Fairness re-
quires that the burden as well as the benefit be elimi-
nated. 
The principal design difficulty stems from the fact that 
the most obvious technique for avoiding a double tax is 
to extend a fair market value basis either to the contrib-
uted asset in the hands of the corporation or to the stock 
received by the shareholder. However, permitting either 
basis adjustment would allow the taxpayer to use the 
mechanism of a section 351 exchange to dispose of an 
asset without the current recognition of gain. Depending 
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on which property basis was increased, either the con-
tributed asset would be sold by the corporation at no 
gain or the stock in the corporation would be sold by the 
shareholder at no gain. That approach, therefore, would 
create a new corporate tax shelter of considerable po-
tency. Rather, to prevent the use of those basis rules to 
create improper tax avoidance, neither basis can be 
adjusted prior to the time that the built-in gain or loss has 
been subject to tax - as under current law. 
Given the need to defer any basis adjustment, the 
double tax that is imposed by current law can be avoided 
only by allowing a single recognition of gain to result in 
a dual basis adjustment - once at the corporate level and 
once at the shareholder level. While that approach would 
somewhat increase the burden of compliance on taxpay-
ers, the greater evil of retroactive double taxation cannot 
be avoided in any other way short of the complete repeal 
of section 351. Fortunately, dual-level basis adjustments 
are a common feature of the taxation of other business 
entities and thus do not create unfamiliar or particularly 
difficult tax issues. 
Double taxation of business profits is avoided in 
passthrough entities, including partnerships and S cor-
porations, by the making of dual basis adjustments. The 
receipt and reinvestment of the proceeds of dispositions 
of assets at the entity level result in the same adjustments 
to the basis of the assets of the partnership or S corpora-
tion as they do to the assets of any other taxpayer. In 
addition, however, the income and loss realized at the 
entity level result in an increase or decrease in the basis of 
the partnership interest or S corporation stock held by the 
owner of the entity.29 That adjustment prevents a second 
tax to the owners of the entity when the business 
earnings are distributed to the partners or shareholders. 
Similarly, when a partnership interest30 is sold, the 
basis of the partnership assets is increased or decreased 
to reflect the gain or loss on the sale.31 In the partnership 
context, that adjustment is made to protect the purchas-
ing partner from a tax on the prepurchase appreciation in 
partnership assets. Accordingly, the adjustment is elec-
tive and applies only to the gain attributable to that 
purchasing partner. For the purposes of this proposal, the 
adjustment would be to protect the corporation from a 
duplicate, corporate level tax and to bar the corporation 
from claiming a duplicate, corporate level loss. Thus, the 
adjustment would be far simpler than the partnership 
adjustment. The basis adjustment should be mandatory, 
not elective, and would apply to the corporate assets for 
the purposes of the corporate income tax. 
The need to avoid the retroactive application of the 
double tax presents the same issues as those presented by 
partnerships and S corporations and should be addressed 
in the same manner. To the extent that gain or loss 
recognized at the corporate level is attributable to appre-
ciation or depreciation contained in an asset contributed 
29Sections 705(a) and 1376(a). 
30No similar adjustment is made in S corporations, an 
omission that represents one of the major deficiencies in that 
form of doing business. 
31Section 734. 
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to the corporation in a section 351 exchange, the basis of 
the stock of the contributing shareholder should be 
adjusted to prevent a second tax.32 Should the share-
holder sell stock before the corporation sells the contrib-
uted asset, to the extent of the built-in gain or loss, the 
basis of the asset in the hands of the corporation should 
be adjusted. Indeed, the desirability of applying those 
partnership concepts to C corporations has been the 
subject of speculation by commentators for many years.33 
In fact, it is not necessary to leave subchapter C to find 
a precedent for making dual basis adjustments. Under 
the long-proposed regulations to the installment report-
ing rules, when a debt instrument is received as boot in a 
section 351 transaction, gain attributable to the exchange 
is reportable under the installment method as modified 
by those regulations.34 Under those rules, the basis of the 
property contributed to the corporation is not increased 
by the gain, the tax on which is deferred under the 
installment method. Similarly, the transferor's basis in the 
debt instrument received in exchange for the property is 
not increased by the amount of the deferred gain. How-
ever, when payments of principal are made on the debt 
instrument, gain will be recognized and taxed to the 
transferor and the basis of the debt will be adjusted 
accordingly. Simultaneously, the basis of the contributed 
property will also be increased by the amount of that 
gain.35 
That treatment of debt received in a section 351 
exchange as prescribed by the regulations parallels the 
treatment of stock proposed here quite closely. The gain 
addressed in the installment sale regulations is gain 
arising before incorporation. Under the installment sale 
rules, the tax on that gain is deferred to a later time and, 
accordingly, the basis adjustment attributable to that gain 
is similarly deferred. However, at that later time, the 
corporation is subject to double taxation and a dual basis 
has been created: the corporation's basis for its assets and 
the transferor debtholder's basis for the debt. To prevent 
the retroactive application of that double tax to the gain, 
as the gain is incurred - here at the debtholder level -
a dual basis adjustment is made. The same adjustment 
for the same reason should be made for all precontribu-
tion gain or loss. 
32Because income taxes are paid by the corporation, the basis 
adjustment to the shareholder should be equal only to the gain 
recognized less the income tax paid on that gain. A similar rule 
is applied to S corporation stock to the extent that S corporations 
are subject to tax on built-in gains. See sections 1367(a)(2)(D) and 
1374. Correspondingly, when a built-in loss is recognized, the 
basis reduction should equal the amount of the loss less the 
amount of the tax saved or refunded. 
33S. Thompson, "Tax Policy Implications of Contributions of 
Appreciated and Depreciated Property to Partnerships, Sub-
chapter C Corporations and Subchapter S Corporations in 
Exchange for Ownership Interests," 31 Tax L. Rev. 29, 85 (1975). 
34prop. reg. section 1.453-1(f)(3)(ii) and (iii). 
35Similarly, to avoid multiple tiers of taxation of the earnings 
of corporations within groups of corporations filing consoli-
dated income tax returns, the earnings of a subsidiary not only 
produce a basis increase to the subsidiary but also result in an 
increase in the basis of the stock of the subsidiary to its parent 
corporation. Reg. section 1.1502-32(a). 
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Because the amount of the dual basis adjustment is 
limited to the amount of the built-in gain or loss at the 
time the property is contributed to the corporation, the 
value of the property on that date must be determined. 
Admittedly, any required valuation that is independent 
of a market transaction establishing value is a source of 
difficulty. Obtaining an accurate valuation can be an 
expense. Any valuation obtained would be subjective 
and thus subject to error and taxpayer manipulation. On 
the other hand, there is ample precedent for requiring the 
valuation of property in analogous settings. Moreover, 
the requirement would add little to what taxpayers 
would otherwise be required to provide. 
On the disposition of property that had been trans-
ferred to a partnership containing a built-in gain or loss, 
the precontribution gain or loss generally must be allo-
cated to the contributing partner36 rather than allocated 
under the partnership'S profit- or loss-sharing ratio. That 
provision requires that the contributed property be val-
ued as of the date of contribution. The requirement here 
would be no different. Similarly, following a subchapter S 
election, the amount of gain inherent in the properties of 
the corporation remains subject to the corporate-level tax 
for a 10-year period.37 That provision, too, requires the 
appraisal of the properties of the corporation at the time 
of the election and in the absence of a market transaction. 
Therefore, on the transfer of property in connection with 
the formation of other forms of business entities, a 
valuation of the properties of the entity is already re-
quired for income tax purposes. The imposition of a 
similar requirement on the formation of C corporations is 
thus entirely consistent with other demands from similar 
needs. 
Except on the formation of a corporation owned by a 
single entity or individual, the parties must arrive at a 
basis for allocating the ownership of the corporation 
among themselves. That basis can only be on a valuation 
of not only the properties to be contributed to the 
corporation, but also of the services. That is, in the 
normal and usual course of events and aside from any 
requirements of the tax law, the parties generally will 
require a valuation of the properties to be contributed to 
the corporation that is accurate enough to satisfy their 
financial needs. In that commonplace circumstance, the 
need for a valuation required by this proposal imposes 
little, if any, added burden on the parties. 
V. Illustrative Examples 
To examine how a dual basis adjustment would work 
in the context of a C corporation, assume the transfer of 
property in a section 351 exchange that has a value of 
$100 and a tax basis of $40. Under the usual basis rules, 
both the stock received in the exchange and the property 
transferred to the corporation will have a tax basis of the 
same $40. 
(a) If the stock in the corporation is thereafter sold for 
$100, a gain of $60 would result. Under existing law, the 
shareholder will obtain a tax basis of $100 in the proceeds 
36Section 704(c)(1). 
37Section 1374(d)(1). 
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received (or in whatever is purchased with those pro-
ceeds). Under this proposal, the $60 of gain would 
require that the corporation also increase the basis of the 
property transferred in the section 351 exchange by $60 to 
$100. Accordingly, on a subsequent sale of the property 
by the corporation for that amount, no second gain or 
loss would be recognized. 
(b) If the stock had been sold for $79 because the value 
of the stock in the corporation did not fully reflect the 
value of the corporate assets,38 the increase in the basis of 
the transferred property would be of the $39 gain to $79. 
On a subsequent sale of the property by the corporation 
for $100, an additional gain of $21 would be recognized. 
That is appropriate. The additional gain of $21, having 
not been realized at the shareholder level has not been 
subject to tax at the shareholder level. Thus, the tax at the 
corporate level does not result in retroactive double 
taxation. The effect of that rule is to divide the single $60 
gain between the shareholder and the corporation. 
(c) If the property had been sold at the corporate level, 
a gain of $60 would result and a tax would be paid. At a 
rate of 35 percent the tax on $60 would be $21. The 
corporation therefore will have a basis of $79 in the 
after-tax proceeds of sale. Under this proposal, that gain 
would also result in an upward adjustment to the basis of 
the shareholder's stock in the amount of $39 ($60-$21). 
Because the value of the corporation would now be $79 
and the basis of the stock would also be $79, the sale of 
the stock would not result in any gain or loss and double 
taxation would be avoided. 
That rule parallels partnership taxation. Under the 
partnership rules, the basis increase at the partner level is 
allocated solely to the contributing partner39 and a simi-
lar rule must be applied here. There would be no 
justification for increasing the basis of the stock interests 
of other shareholders whose stock basis had not been 
determined by that contribution of property. However, 
under partnership rules, because partnerships do not pay 
income tax, the adjustment to the partnership interest is 
equal to the entire amount of the gain - not just the 
after-tax amount of gain. The rule proposed here must 
differ because the corporate tax is paid at the corporate 
level and thus reduces the value of the corporation. 
(d) If instead the property had a value of $40 and a tax 
basis of $100, analogous results would be obtained. If the 
corporation sold the property realizing a loss of $60, it 
would obtain a tax savings of $21. Accordingly, the basis 
of the corporate assets would be reduced by $60 but 
increased by $21 for a net reduction of $39. Correspond-
ingly, the basis of the shareholder's stock would be 
reduced by the same $39 to $61, which would equal the 
remaining value of the corporation. 
38In principle the stock should be valued for less than $100 
because the corporate assets are subject to the liability to pay an 
income tax on the built-in gain. 
3~S occurs because the gain is allocated solely to the 
contributing partner under section 704(c). That aspect of part-
nership tax law is not transferable to C corporations because the 
corporate tax is born by the corporation, not its shareholders. 
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(e) If the shareholder sold stock for $61, an amount 
reflecting the value of the property plus the income tax 
refund, a loss of $39 would be incurred and shareholder's 
basis in the proceeds would be $61. Under this proposal, 
that loss would require a reduction in the basis of the 
property in the hands of the corporation by $39 to $61. 
On a subsequent sale of the property by the corporation 
for its value of $40, a loss of $21 would be incurred. 
Under those circumstances, the overall loss on the 
property of $60 is divided between the shareholder ($39) 
and the corporation ($21). However, no duplication of the 
loss occurs. 
(f) For tax purposes, depreciation constitutes a tax loss 
attributable to the partial disposition of property. That 
loss could be a duplicate loss if it were attributable to 
property that was contributed to the corporation contain-
ing a built-in loss. To prevent the duplication, the basis of 
the stock received in exchange for the property must be 
reduced to the extent that the corporation claimed depre-
ciation on the portion of the basis attributable to the 
built-in loss. The complexity of that approach could be 
somewhat mitigated if corporate-level depreciation were 
treated as first attributable to the portion of the basis that 
did not exceed the value of the property on the date of 
contribution. 
(g) Returning to Dolly Inc., which in fact contributed 
cash subject to the liability to discharge the healthcare 
benefits of its employees, the transferor had a basis of 
$561 million in stock having a value of only $1 million. If 
Dolly sells that stock before the healthcare claims are 
paid, it would have accelerated when the tax benefit from 
those deductions could be claimed. However, it would 
have obtained that tax benefit only at the cost of actually 
parting with whatever was left of the $561 million it 
contributed to the subsidiary. While that transaction 
might be an affront to the accrual method of accounting, 
it is not a particularly potent tax shelter. While the 
Treasury might wish to prevent that manipulation of the 
timing rules of the code, the benefit is distinct from the 
loss replication addressed here. 
Under this proposal, however, on that sale and the 
recognition of the $560 million loss, there should be a 
reduction of the basis of the contributed property in that 
amount in order to prevent a duplicated loss. However, 
Dolly contributed cash that was expended and the basis 
of cash cannot be reduced. The functional equivalent of 
reducing the basis of property held by Dolly's subsidiary 
is to eliminate any other form of tax benefit from the 
expenditure of that cash. Accordingly, the loss recognized 
by Dolly would result in the elimination of any tax 
benefit - that is, deduction - from the expenditure of 
the contributed cash by the subsidiary. As a result, the 
second (or more) loss sought by Dolly would be elimi-
nated. Indeed, the loss replication tax shelter would be 
destroyed. 
However, if Dolly did not sell the stock of the subsid-
iary and the subsidiary did in fact discharge the assumed 
liabilities, the subsidiary would be entitled to deduct the 
expenditure as under current law. However, the basis of 
the stock in the subsidiary held by Dolly would be 
reduced by the amount of the after-tax loss. 
(h) Consider the consequences of incorporating a 
cash-method service business under current law. The 
839 
COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
hypothetical sole proprietorship has cash of $20, accounts 
receivable not reflected in income of $35, and accounts 
payable of $30. If it does not incorporate, it will have net 
income of $5, a tax (at 35 percent) of $1.75 and a net worth 
of $23.25. If it incorporates, the shareholder will obtain 
stock having a basis of $20 and the corporation will have 
a basis in its assets of $20. On the collection of the 
receivables and the payment of the payables, the corpo-
ration will have net income of $5, a tax of $1.75 and a net 
worth of $23.25. If the shareholder then sells stock for its 
net value of $23.25, there will be a gain of $3.25. What 
that demonstrates, again, is the improper retroactive 
imposition of the corporate double tax on income that 
was earned and liabilities that were incurred before 
incorporation. Under the proposal here, the gain and loss 
incurred at the corporate level would result in a net basis 
adjustment to the shareholder of $5 less $1.75, or $3.25. 
As a result, there would be no gain on the sale of the 
stock and no retroactive double taxation. 
VI. Conclusion 
When the income tax laws seem to be producing the 
wrong answer, there has been a tendency, perhaps un-
derstandable, to view the result as a narrow, technical 
glitch requiring a narrow and technical response. Too 
often those easy fixes both complicate the law and detract 
from its structural integrity. Sometimes they miss the real 
problem entirely. The loss-replicating tax shelter is one 
such instance. The need to address the tax avoidance 
potential of that category of tax shelters provides an 
opportunity to redress one of the lingering structural 
flaws in subchapter C. That opportunity should be em-
braced, not avoided. 
Addendum 
Under section 362(e)(2), newly added by the American 
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, p.L. 108-357, the retroactive 
duplicate loss created by the section 351 basis rules is 
eliminated for all transfers of property governed by 
section 351. That extension will help eliminate the un-
even effects of section 358(h), which applied only to a 
limited category of built-in loss. However, like the flawed 
approach of section 358(h), the new provision does 
nothing to eliminate the double taxation of built-in gains 
and thus merely extends the unfairness of current law. 
The approach taken in the new provision to eliminate 
the duplicate loss is different from that suggested above 
and could not be extended to built-in gains. Under 
section 362(e)(2), the duplication can be eliminated at 
either the corporate or the shareholder level, at the 
election of the parties. Thus, under the default rule, the 
aggregate bases of property received by the transferee 
corporation in the section 351 exchange cannot exceed 
the aggregate fair market value of those properties. 
However, at the election of both the transferor and the 
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transferee, that corporate-level limitation will not apply, 
and instead the basis of the stock received by the trans-
feror is reduced to its fair market value. 
It is not clear that the elective elimination of loss will 
be effective to prevent the tax shelter abuses of concern to 
Congress because taxpayers will naturally preserve the 
loss for the taxpayer who will most benefit from its 
realization. However, the approach cannot be extended 
to the elimination of duplicate gains for the reasons 
discussed above: The taxpayer would use the election to 
eliminate gain for the taxpayer planning a taxable dispo-
sition. 
While the new provision should perhaps be welcomed 
as a step toward the integration of the double corporate 
tax with the basis rules of section 351, it does not 
constitute a comprehensive approach to, or the elimina-
tion of, that problem. Moreover, it must be criticized as a 
continuation of the unfairly one-sided approach begun in 
section 358(h). 
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